‘Stop Managing The City In A Hotel Room!’ The Day David Carson Brought Sanity To The Financial Review Board

Carson booksigning
David Ellis Adams Carson, retired CEO of People’s Bank.

What’s government life like with a financial oversight board? Here’s a glimpse from my book Bow Tie Banker, a biography of David Carson, retired chief executive of People’s Bank. Carson had quite a flare-up with then State Treasurer Francisco Borges.

April 6, 1989, Bridgeport, Connecticut: Mayor Thomas W. Bucci was being squeezed. It would be a lot easier to take if the man across the table was a low-life city councilman sticking him up for a raise in exchange for a vote, or a greedy contractor leaning on him for cost overruns for mega campaign donations. The person performing the constriction in the Hilton Hotel’s meeting room was Connecticut State Treasurer Francisco Borges, a cold-blooded taskmaster wielding his statutory sledgehammer. The City of Bridgeport’s budget–destroyed by decades of sagging grand lists, generous pension plans, accounting shorthand, and state and federal funding cutbacks–had gone completely bust in 1988. Out of the morass came shackles: a state oversight board, a group of nine state, city and business leaders called the Bridgeport Financial Review Board. David Ellis Adams Carson, the distinguished chief executive of People’s Bank, was one of the nine.

Connecticut had allowed Mayor Bucci to use state bonding powers to borrow a cool $55 million to pay bills, meet payroll and buy time to plug holes in Bridgeport’s leaky municipal ship. By legislative decree, the financial review board had been created. Its primary task, among a myriad of financial challenges, was to keep the city’s budget in balance. Bucci, a Democrat, was under siege from people within his own party. Democratic Gov. Bill O’Neill, who could have handled the financial matter administratively, had thrown the mayor to the legislative sharks.

Bucci would never forget the day he went to legislative friends for help at the state Capitol in Hartford. Bucci’s city was hemorrhaging cash and he needed to keep this quiet until a financial package was worked out. “Sure, no problem,” said William DiBella, a Democrat and the powerful Senate chairman of the Finance, Revenue and Bonding Committee. By the time the meeting was over and Bucci was headed to Bridgeport, the news was all over the radio. The city was broke and needed a bailout. Instead of tossing Bucci a life jacket, DiBella had thrown him an anchor.

The legislative act that created the financial review board placed Borges, a Democrat, at the helm of an oversight panel that included a cross section of government bureaucrats and business leaders. Handsome, charming, and a skillful public speaker, Borges had an eloquent dispassion about him. A graduate of the University of Connecticut School of Law, he wasn’t going to let the city’s bleeding budget get in the way of his future. If the budget was out of whack, he’d push the city to make cuts and more cuts. Borges was tough medicine in the budgetary process. But the city had reached bone. Bucci had already consolidated Bridgeport’s financial infrastructure and pink-slipped hundreds of workers. He brought in a nationally recognized municipal consultant, Jack Ukeles, to reposition the city’s financial future. Financial review board meetings at the Hilton, featuring Borges’ bureaucratic accountant Donald Kirschbaum and Bucci’s bean counters, were cruel conflicts between scalpel and sanity.

Bucci, in an election year, was facing a sour electorate. Privately, he’d say of Borges and company, “The bastards are killing me.” In discussions of the current budget year, Borges and his accountant maintained the budget was out of balance by $825,000. Bucci and his chief numbers man, Steve Sasala, were protesting the math. Kirschbaum, the blood-sucking accountant, kept changing the rules. One day he asked for a set of figures this way, the next day he asked for them that way. Borges was adamant–cut, even if it means a five percent, across-the-board furlough of municipal workers. Bucci was beside himself. He’d done enough of that. He wasn’t going to close parks and lay off cops. “Take me to court!”

Into the fray stepped the one financial review board member the mayor was allowed to appoint by legislative act: David Carson. Carson, a Republican, was the soft-spoken statesman of the business community–the man with the biggest bank and easily the biggest bow ties. Carson marinated in numbers. He studied them as part of his major at the University of Michigan. In the U.S. Army, as a test analyst, he had calibrated the fuse efficiency of hand grenades. As a young businessman in his 30s, he cut his teeth as chief actuary and senior vice president of The Hartford insurance company. Now he was CEO of People’s Bank, the largest bank headquartered in America’s wealthiest state. Bank employees were always nervously mindful that if the numbers they handed him were incorrect this immigrant from Birkenhead, England would most assuredly remind them. Carson understood economic crisis. Why, just 18 months earlier, October 19, 1987, Black Monday brought Wall Street to its knees, the very day–talk about rotten timing–Carson was scheduled to take his bank public. In a neat sidestep around Kirschbaum’s figures, Carson urged adoption of the city’s revenue and expenditures for the rest of the year, with the addition of a $2 million contingency mandated in the next budget year, to cover possible shortfalls.

Borges would not have it. “There is no discretion in the language, no latitude” in the legislative act to do that, Borges protested.

“This is a bunch of legalism, not operationalism,” Carson fired back, never one to blow a cork unless absolutely necessary. “There are other interpretations of the law.”

“The law says,” Borges responded, “if the city is out of balance, we’ve got to …”

Carson, turning crimson, leaned forward. “Accept the goddamn plan and stop trying to manage the city in a hotel room! You can’t do that!”

In the next instant Carson moved a motion to accept the city’s financial position. In a 5-4 vote the financial review board sided with Carson, ordering the city to begin presenting data for the next fiscal year. After the meeting Carson talked with Bridgeport Light newspaper reporter Jim Callahan. Actuarial scales are developed in “ranges,” Carson pointed out, stressing the city’s figures were within range of providing a balanced budget. The bank executive explained it was more important to move on to next year’s budget to make positively sure that one worked. “I’m a businessman,” Carson explained. “I never believe anybody’s figures. So I don’t believe Don’s (Kirschbaum) either.”

In David Carson’s pragmatic world, life wasn’t just about numbers.



  1. It seems the tension between Borges and Carson was beneficial to the city, for the time permitted to them to try to right the financial ship, to the extent they could.

    Would Ganim 1 have not strayed into illegality had an outside financial overseer been present throughout?

  2. Since the times written about above, the entire fiscal scene has moved into darkness and is stuck there. For a “second-chance” candidate to request such and provide less than his previous opposition in terms of specifics on City priorities, payroll listings, and retiree payments, is acknowledgement Ganim is asking for “pure” trust rather than “verified” trust. Is that a smart course for anyone, citizen, voter, taxpayer, developer, employee or retiree? Time will tell.

  3. Dave Carson arrived at People’s Bank in 1983. It was a significant year for me as I completed my MBA and was named a junior officer at People’s. It was also the year Mayor Len Paoletta appointed me to the Mayor’s Financial Advisory Committee. The responsibilities of this board along with the Board of Apportionment and Taxation were transferred to the city council in the charter revision of 1988.
    Mayor Tom Bucci reappointed me to this board, whose membership included a local bank president and other business leaders. (I was the newby.) Actions of this board were related to long-term finances such as bonding. I will never forget the meeting to review bonding of $58 million which the State of Connecticut guaranteed as part of the special legislation that created the Financial Review Board.
    In 1989 I ran for city council as an underling of Len Paoletta. Instead, Mary Moran won a close primary and the mayoral race. I was thrust into a leadership role I was not prepared for. John Stafstrom provided guidance to me that was not well-received in the Moran administration.
    The Financial Review Board OPM staff was calling the shots, often to the point of micromanaging. Bridgeport was fortunate to have Dave Carson with his patient and polite demeanor, allowed him to make his points based on his unquestioned expertise in analyzing finances. At times, as Lennie noted, he found it necessary to step outside his normal demeanor to make a needed business decision.

    I feel the issue at hand is whether the fiscal oversight of Bridgeport can be handled properly by individuals, as well-meaning as some may be, who are, essentially, appointed by the Democratic Town Committee. Is there a better model to follow that would include non-partisan, educated people with the expertise to focus on details and demand answers?

    Every two years there is an election of city council members. Typical turnover is five or six of the 20, depending on the current purge or infighting within the DTC. Occasionally, competent people are elected but their efforts tend to be squashed by the priorities of the current mayor and/or DTC.

    What is the solution? It would be great if Bridgeport had a business leader who could step forward and demand that the management of the City of Bridgeport be taken seriously.

    1. Tom, we have a business leader who has stepped forward and demanded that management of the Country be taken seriously and that’s Donald Trump.

  4. I have met with Dave Carson to discuss his past experience and Bridgeport’s current challenges. He agrees with me, the Bridgeport Financial Review Board he chaired did not have enough power to achieve fiscal sustainability. We must not make the same mistake twice!

    1. Tom,
      Correct, and they must be “on the table” this time. They will automatically be on the table in bankruptcy. A Financial Oversight Board with appropriate authority is clearly preferable to bankruptcy. Its actions can help to improve Bridgeport as a place to live and business, create more job opportunities for Bridgeport residents, and avoid bankruptcy. That is a positive trifecta worth fighting for.


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