Fire Department Struggles With Internal Flames Over Pension Plan

Last week Stuart Rosenberg, the long-time chairman of the Board of Fire Commissioners, resigned in a dispute involving the city’s proposed changes to the retirement benefits of city firefighters. James Morley also resigned as treasurer and a trustee of the Pension Plan B. How and where pension benefits are executed has become the talk of the town among municipal employees. Financial watchdog and citizen journalist John Marshall Lee spent several days researching and interviewing officials associated with this pension issue. He files this report that provides background, process and potential impact.

Personal integrity is difficult to observe, especially in the field of public service it seems since it is infrequently encountered. The reasons are probably manifold but that is not the subject of my story today. Rather I wish to point to an example of individual integrity in the midst of chaos respecting Mayoral appointment practices and fiscal decisions by Trustees that have long-term ramifications and serious consideration of what it means to be a community fiduciary, a Trustee where it is very difficult to be fair to all concerned, but certainly worth trying.

The Fire Union settled a contract in the spring of 2012. One change meant fire personnel who are employed currently will look to the State of CT MERF (Municipal Employees Retirement Fund) for future pension benefits. (Currently Fire Commissioners are joined by two Fire union members to form the Fire Pension Plan B Board.) From that point both City retirement contributions and firefighter contributions would flow to MERF. One additional fact: a portion of the approximate $72 Million of Fire Plan B assets (June 30, 2012) would be transferred to the State. I have been told about $22 Million of those assets passed from the Plan B Trust to the State last July, 2012 based on the unanimous vote of the Trustees on the Fire Plan B Pension Board.

At that point the balance of the fund, worth about $50 Million, would remain with the Plan B Pension Trustees, with NO FURTHER INFLOW of regular funding since all retirees had left City employment, earning an investment return and paying out COLA increased benefits every year to those retired or 50% to their survivors until the last person is dead. Of course, if the assets diminish or expire before the last beneficiary dies, THE CITY TAXPAYER WILL AGAIN BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYING PLAN BENEFITS.

The Fire Commission is supposed to have seven members appointed by the Mayor subject to Council approval. As of last month there were only five members serving. Two vacancies existed. If as reported on Only In Bridgeport the Chairman resigned, then the Pension Board may have only six members. Per its rules can it function to vote on matters? If the City is presenting alternatives that would transfer $10s of Millions to the State, what is the advantage to all parties?

Of course before the Chair’s resignation, not one of the five public members was serving an unexpired term. That is an opportunity where the Mayor enjoys ‘special influence’ towards “See it my way, or take the highway!” (I do not have the minutes of significant meetings since they are not in the City Clerk office. I have been told they are in the Clerk of the Commission office but he has to report my request for the minutes to the City Attorney office, per City policy, and I have been told I need an FOI request. That’s a topic for another essay on another day, titled “The FOI Dance.”) It is crippling in its effect on personal integrity, as well as taxpayer-citizens becoming informed!

Some Background: The Commission did something unusual for a Bridgeport board. They hired an independent consulting actuary and an outside attorney who specialized in retirement plans. This was to assist them to know the effects of a decision they would be required to make. They studied the characteristics of the current, future and past beneficiaries as well as the Plan B pension formula and ran at least four alternatives to guide the Trustees in being both fair to all parties and realistic in assumptions. The Trustees selected a middle of the road path including a lower assumed net investment return, 4.25 with .75 assumed expenses, than the current 8% and a 3% COLA. They did not look to guarantee benefits for the current retirees by way of purchasing an annuity that would have been more expensive. They used Federal ERISA Section 4044 asset allocation guidelines to support transfer of the $22 million to the State MERF and retain $50 Million for the Fire Plan B Trustees. This was less than the estimated $60,721,000 liability estimate of a “risk-free valuation.” The transfer occurred after June 30, 2012 according to the 2012 City external audit (CAFR).

Keeping too little money in Plan B poses a future risk to City taxpayers if annually reducing pension assets prove insufficient to meet retiree benefits in the real world. Providing more funds, perhaps $10 millions, to the State at this time (in addition to those transferred last spring) seems of no real benefit to City taxpayers. However, is the administration attempting to cut down current obligations to the State, funded by the City operating budget? Or is there some other undisclosed reason? What would make a long-time careful Trustee resign, and the City attempt to provide less than a full story? This is the issue of the moment and deserves more investigation.

Stay tuned to see how soon this Commission will be restored to full size. See whether the Mayor, while focused on new appointments, chooses to re-appoint worthy members to full new terms allowing them to exercise their abilities and judgments rather than being ‘hand puppets’ for the administration. And, when will agendas, minutes and exhibits for minutes become consolidated as hard-copy public records at the City Clerk office without need for FOI for all boards, commissions, councils and committees? How many years will it take for all of these to be available electronically, like so many of the Mayor’s messages? Time will tell.

(The Chairman of the Fire Commission and of the Pension Plan B Fire Board was Stuart Rosenberg, a lifetime Bridgeport resident. He is a registered voter, unaffiliated with any party. He has served on the Fire Commission for more than 25 years and would seem to have been mayorally re-appointed to the Board at least once in the past because his term expired within the past six years. Previously he was a member and President of Bridgeport’s “finance board,” the Board of Taxation and Apportionment, before Charter Reform, approved by the voters, eliminated that body.)

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16 comments

  1. For years, state and local governments have been playing imaginative or patently dishonest games with their pension funds, thinking they could get away with it. But now the chickens are coming home to roost, as federal authorities have begun cracking down on corruption and mismanagement.

    The modus operandi was much the same in state after state: government officials underfunding or skimming retiree pension funds to meet other more immediate costs; financial officers papering over or hiding the extent of the funding shortfalls; and private financial managers exaggerating the return they could deliver on pension fund investments while often leaving the fund vulnerable to unexpected market swings.

    State pensions, still feeling the pain of the Great Recession, are now underfunded to the tune of more than $4 trillion, according to State Budget Solutions, a non-partisan fiscal watchdog.

    In the past week alone, government officials and private investment groups with major government contracts have learned hard lessons about the risks of playing fast and loose with the government retirement systems:

    • The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Illinois with securities fraud following years in which state officials misled investors and shortchanged the state pension system and stuck future generations of taxpayers with the staggering bill. The suit was part of a larger push by the SEC to bring greater transparency and accountability to the municipal bond market, according to the Wall Street Journal.

    Read more at www .thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/03/22/Mismanaged-State-Pensions-Bill-Taxpayers-for-Shortfall.aspx.

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  2. JML–For what it’s worth, there is no provision in Plan B for COLA increases so I am unsure as to why that would be factored by the actuary. Also, the plan is not bound by the ERISA standard because it is not applicable to municipalities. These are just a couple of quick observations that speak to the possible scenario where the numbers were skewed in favor of plan B retirees. The actuarial study is only as good as the information they were provided. I think the city is wise to revisit the issue and determine if the monies were divided equitably.

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    1. park city fan,
      You raise two interesting “quick observations.” Since I am happy to have someone read this info and respond let me share some type of answer to your comments.

      The study was done by Hooker and Holcombe. The Cost of Living Adjustment mentioned in their report does not relate to Social Security or some other outside inflation adjustment. I believe what it refers to is the same type of adjustment Pension Plan A retirees currently receive. In other words, in the new Fire Contract agreed to last April, if the firefighters receive an increase in pay, there is a COLA adjustment made to the Retiree benefits and those of the terminated vesteds. Since this type of COLA adjustment is in place for the older retired fire group it is likely this is what the actuary comprehends and assumes. I apologize for not making that more clear in the article.

      You also comment, “the plan is not bound by the ERISA standard because it is not applicable to municipalities.” We have no disagreement on that account. You will notice I did not say ERISA rules governed the Fire Plan B Pension, right? What I reported is the TRUSTEES in their wisdom had been using ERISA practices in a most pragmatic manner for several years to guide their responsibilities where it could enhance their behavior for all parties concerned. It was not a new practice for the Trustees (if you were able to review the Board minutes for several years). In the case of division of assets, something most unusual in the life of a Plan Trustee, ERISA guidelines were most helpful to use as a model of responsible Trustee action, with which, I assume, you would have no problem.

      Finally the article touched on Administration behavior regarding availability of public documents and timely recruitment, selection and appointment (or re-appointment) of qualified community volunteers to public bodies. You made no comment about the critical governance issues. Are you in favor of “hand puppetry” or “my way, or the highway” attitude towards those who serve publicly? Over 95% of the Mayoral appointed positions on Boards and Commissions are either vacant or filled by people serving expired terms, subject to “puppetry” or control. Perhaps you can spare a moment to provide a comment in this regard. Time will tell.

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  3. It would seem the mayor has shortchanged the plan B fund. On the other hand, what is the state doing? You would think they would have looked at the plan, recipients and available funds. Shouldn’t the state have SOME responsibility to make sure the mayor is making prudent choices? I mean, other than having the ability to get elected, a mayor does not necessarily have any other qualifications to do anything, let alone make financial decisions on complex retirement pensions. You would think the state would review the available information, in this case there was a lot, and make sure nothing was going to come back to bite them.
    It is curious your government, at all levels, makes rules that must be followed, then they exempt themselves from following the rules. All food served in the country must have nutrition info on it by law. Food served by the government is exempt. ERISA practices are good rules for retirement plans but the government is exempt from those rules. It would seem they made rules to stop people from cheating and stealing but made it so they can still steal and cheat.

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  4. The article in the CT Post on this made a lot of sense and had a totally different point of view. Apparently, the mayor can make hard choices with other people’s money.

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  5. I wonder if BOE SPY found anything in the CT Post article that didn’t make sense. This is part of that article:

    Kelly-Lenz said the trustees failed in that duty because they skewed the numbers to favor the retirees and did not take into account the active fire employees who contribute 6 percent of their base pay into plan B.

    “What they’re doing is giving themselves preferential treatment by being 100 percent funded, to the detriment of the active members,” she said, of the trustees.

    Based on the state’s recommendation, Kelly-Lenz said, the trustees should have transferred $45 million into MERS for the 266 active employees, not just over $22 million, and retained $29 million for the 79 retirees at the time the report was done.

    If the trustees should have transferred $45 million instead of the $22 million, why did the state accept that amount in the first place? Also if the trustees should have transferred $45 million instead of the $22 million, why is the administration requesting the trustees transfer an additional $10 million instead of $23 million which would total $45 million? I suspect the administration is planning to transfer an additional $13 million in the future. This will put the total amount transferred to that $45 million Kelly-Lenz has her lenses on.

    Read more: www .ctpost.com/local/article/Battle-heats-up-over-Bridgeport-fire-pensions-4425174.php

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    1. Yeah, I saw that. I was commenting on how JML’s article made it look like the city was being very unfair to current retirees (which they may have been) and how the Post’s article made it look like the trustees are being very unfair to current workers. The trustees are not tasked with looking out for the employees. Their only job is to care for the retirees. So you have this scenario. Lots of people paid into Plan B and a few are collecting. Now, the workers are moving to MERF. The question is, how much of the money in Plan B belongs to the retirees and how much belongs to the workers? Seems their is some disagreement on that point. The entire thing seems to be a really bad idea. MERF has always been broke and now Plan B is broke as well. I do not understand why they did not just vest everyone who paid into Plan B at whatever level they paid up to and start all the current workers over with MERF? Then you would receive retirement income from both sources and the amount would depend on how long you were in each plan. Then after the last retiree leaves Plan B, whatever is left can be transferred to MERF. Or by the time Plan B runs out of money the number of people who draw from the plan would be small and the amount each person receives from the plan would be small.
      I wonder if Finch was tasked with bailing out MERF or at least delaying its inevitable collapse while Malloy spends boatloads of money on feel-good gun legislation and other such whimsical pursuits.

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      1. If you want to know some more about the subject, the best general background source available immediately to the public is in the external audit, the Comprehensive Annual Financial Report – 2012. Before last week when the City Council spent less than two hours to ask OPM, Finance and CAO Directors some questions, there has been no such meeting or hearing on the CAFR. It’s a shame because we pay nearly $300,000 annually, cannot get to see the MANAGEMENT LETTERS that are annually sent to the City, but the report itself has lots of good info. Go to pages 52-62 # 12. Pension Plans.

        Plan A is the pension in the greatest trouble with a funded ratio of about 51%. That contrasts with the Plan B Police at 81% and Plan B Fire at 77.6 as of last June 30, 2012 (page 60). Go back one page to 59 and you will see one reason for the underfunding is the City contributed 71.5% of Annual Required Contribution for Plan A, 86.7% for Plan B Police and 68.4% for Plan B Fire. That funding insufficiency has long-term implications as you can see in the record of Plan A on page 59. Keep funding below what the actuaries indicate and your sick plan gets sicker.

        One other observation on the plans that is a problem for Federal, State, Municipal and private plans receives note on page 56. You can see our City plan has a “significant actuarial assumption” as to “investment rate of return” of 8%. With a portfolio investing in mostly cash, bonds and equities with specific asset allocations, what have been the returns for the past 10 years, annually? How do actual returns compare to assumed rate of return? If the actual is less than assumed over a period of time, why do we keep the assumption at what would appear to be an unreasonable rate of return? (Is this a good question for a Trustee?) Well, to lower the assumption from 8% to 6% or 4% will require more funding annually. How do you do that without raising taxes or cutting “holy budgets?” You can’t so you punt the ball into the future, right? And that is what has been done.

        The fiduciary approach followed by the Fire Trustees with a unanimous vote last spring used a “realistic” gross long-term rate of return of 4%. I have not seen what the State study assumes in requesting added funding at this time, with which the City agrees, but if there is a “vast difference between … numbers” perhaps it will be best explained by making sure the “investment return assumptions” are identical.

        Contrary to Anne Kelly-Lenz’ comment in Keila Torres CT Post article this morning, the Hooker and Holcombe assumption chosen by the Trustees did not provide 100% surety to those retired. Why is the City pushing so hard on the State’s recommendation after all? Does the City get an advantage from providing more money for the active Fire employees moved to MERF? If so, this is not disclosed.

        Finally, since I have been a Trustee for funds under a trust agreement on one or more occasions and am beginning to wonder whether the Mayor, the Finance Director and other City financial administrators who operate Pension Plan A operate as Trustees under a different set of rules on liability from the current Fire Pension Trustees (or the Police Pension B Trustees). If the Mayor wears a hat as City CEO and as lead Pension Plan A Committee member, when he inquires of investment advisers as to potential for increasing return (that may also make the Plan less liquid) OR when he proposes a budget that does not fund the actuarially determined annual accrued liability can Plan A beneficiaries hold him legally responsible? I am not an attorney, an accountant or an actuary unfortunately. That is why I ask so many questions on which I hope to get answers. The City is short on background and answers at the moment it appears. Time will tell.

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  6. JML, once pension funds are transferred to MERF State, the decisions as to how to invest the funds fall on the State. Who in the State of Connecticut will and has been making these decisions? Don’t tell me it’s Denise (let’s borrow) Napier and her crew.

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  7. Joel, I do not have the time to reference that for you faster than you can do it for yourself. I have watched you work in the past. My guess is there are multiple plans, perhaps with multiple boards and probably multiple advisers. Teachers retirement fund is different from MERF as an example. The underfunding is no secret. And I think you will find the investment return assumptions too high to be reasonable in the recent climate.

    And if you can find a display on the background plan info, share it with all of us as I just did regarding the CAFR-2012. My mom never provided me life instructions based on a box of chocolates, but she did tell me “many hands make for lighter work” so let’s share the workload. Time will tell.

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